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A	founder	of	Korea’s	nuclear	program	
tells	how	Korea	began	nuclear	research	
as	a	Third	World	nation	after	World	
War	II,	and	within	50	years	developed	
into	an	industrial	powerhouse,	
supplying	27	percent	of	the	nation’s	
electricity	by	nuclear	power.
As	the	chairman	of	KEPIC,	the	Korea	Electric	Power	Industry	Code	Committee,	for	the	past	15	years,	C.K.	Lee	has	mobilized	
and	managed	350	engineering	professors	and	professional	engineers	dispatched	from	six	engineering-related	academic	soci-
eties.	KEPIC’s	2005	edition	consists	of	five	parts	contained	in	83	volumes	or	some	27,000	pages,	about	3.2	meters	thick.	Dr.	
Lee	is	also	a	former	Commissioner	on	the	Atomic	Energy	Commission	of	South	Korea,	and	a	former	chairman	of	the	Interna-
tional	Nuclear	Societies	Council.
This	article	is	adapted	from	Dr.	Lee’s	book-length	presentation	at	the	Summer	Institute	of	the	World	Nuclear	University,	held	
in	Korea	 in	August	2007.	A	previous	article,	“A	Nuclear	Perspective	 from	Asia,”	appeared	 in	 the	Winter	2002-2003	21st	
Century.
The	author	can	be	reached	at	changkunlee@gmail.com
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Korea’s	Yongwang	nuclear	complex	with	six	reactors. 
Korea’s Nuclear Past, 
Present, and Future
by	Dr.	Chang	Kun	Lee
One	day	in	1958,	Mr.	Walker	Lee	Cisler	made	a	courtesy	call	on	Dr.	Syngman	Rhee,	the	Korean	President.	Mr.	Cisler,	one-time	CEO	and	Chairman	of	the	Chicago-based	Commonwealth	Edi-
son	Company,	had	helped	to	rehabilitate	the	electric	grids	of	Europe	in	
the	post-war	period,	under	General	Dwight	Eisenhower,	the	Allied	Forces	
Commander.
The	meeting	between	the	two	men	was	reported	in	the	press,	and	we	
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can	imagine	the	conversation	as	having	proceeded	along	
the	following	lines:
President	Rhee	asked	if	any	radical	measures	were	avail-
able	that	could	be	undertaken	to	address	the	problem	of	
chronic	power	shortage	in	Korea.	Mr.	Cisler	answered:
“Well,	there	is	a	way,	Mr.	President.	It’s	a	somewhat	dif-
ficult	option	perhaps,	but	nevertheless	worth	trying.”
“And	the	option	is?”
Mr.	Cisler	took	out	a	wooden	box	from	his	brief	bag.	“An	en-
ergy	box	of	this	small	a	size	with	uranium	fuel	can,	under	the	
right	conditions,	undergo	a	fission	reaction,	and	generate	an	en-
ergy	equivalent	of	100	 freight	cars	 loaded	with	coal	or	a	big	
tanker	filled	with	petroleum.”
	“Wow!,”	marveled	the	Princeton	Ph.D.	President	who,	ad-
mittedly,	was	not	a	physicist.	“How	is	that	possible?”
	“You	see,	Mr.	President,	uranium	atoms	when	split	will	re-
lease	energy	some	3	million	times	more	than	what	fossil	fuel	can	
in	terms	of	weight.	We	are	talking	about	nuclear	energy	here.”
	“Is	this	something	that	we	Koreans	can	harness	to	resolve	our	
energy	problems?”
“Of	course,”	Mr.	Cisler	said	emphatically.
“What	would	be	involved	for	us	to	get	started?”
“Well,	this	energy	source	would	not	be	easily	extracted	from	
the	ground	like	coal	or	oil	but,	rather,	it	will	be	squeezed	from	
the	human	brain,	insofar	as	it	involves	technological	manipula-
tion	and	prowess.	It’s	new	technology-based	energy	for	which	
you	will	need	many	high-quality	scientists	and	engineers.	Nur-
turing	capable,	dedicated	manpower	will	be	key	for	the	task.”
“Thank	you,	Walker!	And	when	do	you	suppose	Korean	peo-
ple	will	start	benefiting	from	this	thing	you	call	nuclear	energy?”
“Probably	in	two	decades,”	was	Mr.	Cisler’s	prediction.
True	 to	Mr.	Cisler’s	prediction,	 the	Korean	nuclear	 industry	
began	supplying	nuclear-based	electricity	to	the	nation	as	of	July	
20,	1978,	exactly	20	years	after	the	Rhee-Cisler	meeting.	And	
another	20	years	later,	Korean	nuclear	power	plants,	accounting	
for	some	20	percent	of	 total	power-generating	 facilities,	were	
supplying	 roughly	40	percent	of	 the	nation’s	power	needs	 at	
very	low-priced	rates.
The	Nuclear	Sector	and	How	It	Began
Korea	has	20	operating	nuclear	power	reactors	deployed	at	
four	sites,	with	a	total	capacity	amounting	to	17,716	megawatts,	
which	 is	 27	 percent	 of	 the	 total	 generating	 capacity	 (65,560	
MW),	supplying	39	percent	of	the	nation’s	power	need	in	2006.	
Six	additional	units	 (6,800	MW)	are	under	construction,	 and	
two	others	(2,800+	MW)	are	currently	in	the	planning	stage.
We	believe	that	the	nuclear	share	in	the	fuel	structure	of	total	
power	 generation	will	 gradually	 increase	 in	 the	 forthcoming	
years.	To	be	precise,	today’s	27	percent	nuclear	share	will	in-
crease	to	29	percent	by	2020.
The	cost	of	electricity	generated	from	the	Korea	Electric	Power	
Corporation’s	 coal-fired	 plants,	 hydro-plants,	 oil-fired	 plants,	
and	LNG-fired	plants	was	1.42,	2.19,	3.0,	and	3.45	times	than-
that	from	nuclear	power	plants	in	2006	(Figure	2).
Walker	 Lee	 Cisler,	 the	 Atoms	 for	 Peace	 ambassador,	
helped	Korea	and	other	nations	move	 into	 the	nuclear	
age.
Dr.	Syngman	Rhee,	the	first	Korean	President	(right),	at	the	ground-
breaking	for	the	first	nuclear	reactor	in	Korea,	a	research	reactor.	Rhee	
pursued	an	Atoms	for	Peace	program,	to	take	his	nation	into	the	21st	
Century.
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Under	the	framework	of	KEDO,	the	Korea	Energy	Develop-
ment	Organization,	the	Republic	of	Korea	started	to	construct	
two	Korea	Standard	Nuclear	Power	Plant,	1,000	MW-class	pres-
surized	water	reactor	units	in	North	Korea,	but	the	construction	
of	these	reactors	was	suspended	for	politico-diplomatic	reasons,	
especially	the	reckless	nuclear	bomb	development	and	its	test	
by	North	Korea.
When	World	War	II	ended,	the	installed	capacity	of	power	
generation	 facilities	 on	 the	 Korean	 peninsula	 totalled	 1,921	
megawatts.	Of	 this,	North	Korea	accounted	 for	88.5	percent,	
while	the	south,	with	twice	the	popu-
lation,	had	merely	the	remaining	11.5	
percent	of	capacity,	comprising	mostly	
small,	inefficient	facilities.
The	legacy	of	Japanese	colonialism	
meant	that	until	1945,	there	were	only	
205	Korean	university	graduates	in	the	
entire	country	who	had	been	educated	
at	four-year-course	institutes	of	higher	
learning	 in	 Japan	 and	 elsewhere.	 In	
fact,	 regular	universities	were	not	es-
tablished	 in	 Korea	 until	 the	 end	 of	
World	War	II,	except	for	one	(the	pre-
decessor	 of	 Seoul	National	Universi-
ty),	which	was	newly	founded	in	Seoul	
primarily	for	the	education	of	Japanese	
students.
There	was	a	handful	of	graduates	of	
European	and	American	colleges.	Ko-
rea’s	Third	World	status	at	this	juncture	
in	history	can	be	seen	in	the	fact	that	
South	 Korea	 could	 claim	 fewer	 than	
100	college	graduates	with	science	
and	engineering	degrees	in	the	im-
mediate	years	following	World	War	
II.	These	engineers	and	science	pro-
fessionals	would	soon	become	piv-
otal	 technocrats	 for	 running	 the	
country.	 Such	 intellectual	 man-
power	 shortage	 was	 the	 result	 of	
Japan’s	obscurant	policy	for	the	co-
lonial	Korea.
The	 state	of	 underdevelopment	
was	 so	dire	 that	 the	U.S.	military	
deputy	governor,	Charles	Helmick,	
was	led	to	comment	in	1948:	“Ko-
rea	 can	 never	 attain	 a	 high	 stan-
dard	 of	 living.	There	 are	 virtually	
no	Koreans	with	technical	training	
and	 experience	 required	 to	 take	
advantage	of	Korea’s	resources	and	
effect	an	improvement	over	its	re-
cent	rice	economy	status.”	Ampli-
fying	 this	 view,	 Helmick	 added,	
“When	the	U.S.	occupation	forces	withdrew	and	stopped	send-
ing	in	supplies	that	south	Korea	needed,	it	would	be	reduced	to	
a	bull-cart	economy	and	some	9	million	non-food	producers	
will	face	starvation.”
After	World	War	II,	the	southern	part	of	Korea,	which	had	em-
braced	millions	of	refugees	from	the	north,	Japan,	Manchuria,	
and	China,	had	only	11.5	percent	of	the	nation’s	power-genera-
tion	facilities	and	was	able	to	supply	no	more	than	4	percent	of	
its	electricity	requirements.	So,	the	south	was	at	the	total	mercy	
of	the	north	for	power	supply.
Figure	2
RELATIVE	COST	OF	ELECTRICITY	BY	FUEL		
(Based	on	rates	paid	by	KEPCO	in	2006)
Nuclear	is	the	least	expensive	fuel.	The	most	expensive,	liquid	natural	gas,	is	3.45	
times	the	price	KEPCO	paid	for	nuclear.	Costs	are	shown	in	won,	the	Korean	cur-
rency.
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North	Korea	brought	the	south	to	its	knees	by	abruptly	cutting	
off	the	power	supply	to	the	south	on	May	14,	1948,	causing	crip-
pling	blackouts	and	widespread	brownouts	throughout	the	na-
tion.	The	U.S.	Military	Administration	brought	in	power	supply	
barges—Jacona	(20	megawatts)	and	Electra	(6.9	MW),	and	later	
Impedance,	to	the	South	Korean	ports,	to	meet	the	urgent	need.
That	abrupt	power	cutoff	was	actually	a	prelude	to	the	main	
knockout	punch:	The	north	struck	on	June	25,	1950,	beginning	
the	Korean	War.
Under	the	pretext	of	homeland	unification,	the	northern	re-
gime	attacked	the	south,	and	the	result	was	a	total	destruction	of	
all	cities	and	towns	in	every	nook	and	cranny	of	the	Korean	pen-
insula.	What	industrial	plants	and	factories	that	had	been	there,	
were	laid	to	waste,	and	the	northern	regime’s	kidnappings	and	
selective	killings,	especially	of	educated	Koreans,	further	bled	
the	nation.	The	war	exacted	a	terrible	toll	from	the	already	im-
poverished	population,	and	further	scarred	the	national	psyche,	
which	was	already	hurting	from	35	years	of	colonial	subjugation	
under	Japan.
However,	where	once	ashes	smoldered,	now	stands	a	vibrant	
and	dynamic	nation,	with	aspirations	toward	becoming	an	im-
portant	player	in	the	global	economy.	Where	war	once	raged,	
now	stands	a	thriving	economic	engine	putting	out	state-of-the-
art	high-tech	software	and	hardware	products,	including	those	
in	the	nuclear	sector.	And	out	of	the	detritus	of	war	was	born	the	
Korean	 nuclear	 industry.	Over	 the	 years,	 the	 Korean	 nuclear	
community	has	had	 to	 face	many	challenges.	And	yet,	 it	has	
thrived.	I	will	summarize	here	Korea’s	nuclear	power	projects	in	
view	of	the	past	and	present	perspectives,	and	a	hopeful	future.
The	Early	Days
President	Rhee	would	have	been	heartened	by	 the	sight	of	
some	15	engineers	and	scientists,	mostly	in	their	late	20s	and	
garbed	in	military	uniforms,	voluntarily	putting	their	noses	to	the	
grindstone	at	weekend	seminars	on	nuclear	 technology,	 from	
1955	onward.	The	textbook	we	used	was	Raymond	Murray’s	In-
troduction	 to	Nuclear	Engineering,	which	was	copied	 for	 the	
seminar	participants	by	a	 typewriter	and	manual	printing	kit,	
and	these	seminars,	conducted	in	a	warehouse-like	room,	were	
begun	some	four	years	before	Mr.	Cisler	admonished	the	Presi-
The	growth	rate	of	electricity	supply	in	the	past	was	ex-
tremely	high:	23.2	percent	per	annum	in	the	1960s,	15.5	per-
cent	in	the	1970s,	and	11.2	percent	in	the	1980s,	which	were	
good	indications	of	rapid	industrialization	in	those	periods,	
the	so-called	the	Economic	Miracle	Era.	In	current	years,	it	
has	been	4.6	percent	per	annum,	but	it	will	decrease	to	1.8	
percent	in	2011-2015,	and	then	to	1.0	percent	in	2016-2020.	
This	downhill	 trend	will	 be	attributed	 to	 the	 rapid	 shift	 of	
GDP’s	main	contributor	from	heavy	industry	to	the	commer-
cial	sector,	inter	alia,	the	service	industry,	that	is	now	skyrock-
eting	in	Korea.
It	 is	 estimated	 that	 the	 electricity	 demand	 in	 2020	will	
amount	to	478,555	million	kWh,	which	will	be	1.4	times	the	
consumption	in	2006	(248,719	million	kWh).	The	electricity	
share	out	of	the	total	amount	of	energy	consumption	in	Korea	
will	gradually	increase	with	time,	in	such	a	way	that	it	will	
increase	to	19.4	percent	in	2020	compared	to	16.6	percent	
in	2005.
The	total	primary	energy	demand	in	2005	was	229	million	
Ton	Oil	Equivalent	(TOE),	and	it	is	estimated	to	be	396	mil-
lion	TOE	in	2030.	In	the	years	up	to	2030,	demand	increase	
forecast	is	presumed	to	be	about	2.2	percent	per	annum.	The	
increase	 in	 demand	 for	 petroleum	 and	
coal	will	be	low,	but	that	for	liquid	natural	
gas,	nuclear,	and	renewable	energy	will	
be	relatively	high	because	of	environmen-
tal	concerns.
In	terms	of	energy	demand	by	sectors,	
the	 industrial	 and	 transportation	 sectors	
will	show	slow	increase,	while	that	of	the	
commercial	sector	will	make	a	rapid	in-
crease,	 because	 of	 the	 mushrooming	
growth	of	the	service	industry.
The	annual	growth	rate	of	electricity	in	
Korea	was	always	higher	than	the	nation’s	
annual	GDP	growth	rate,	in	the	period	of	
1999	through	2006.	For	instance,	the	an-
nual	electricity	growth	rate	in	2005	was	
about	 6.5	 percent	 against	 4.2	 percent	
GDP	growth	rate	in	the	same	year.	But	the	
two	 growth	 rates	 levelled	 off,	 to	 be	 the	
same,	4.5	percent,	in	2006.PRIMARY	ENERGY	DEMAND	FORECAST	IN	KOREA
Electricity	Demand	in	Korea
Demand increase forecast: 2.2% per year
2005: 229 M Ton Oil Equivalent 
2030: 396 M Ton Oil Equivalent
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dent	 in	 the	 Blue	House	 about	 the	 importance	 of	manpower	
training	for	developing	nuclear	energy.
For	about	10	years,	beginning	in	the	1950s,	college	graduates	
were	 dispatched	 abroad	 to	 receive	 basic	 training	 in	 nuclear	
technologies,	including	radioisotope	applications.	The	main	in-
cubator	was	the	U.S.	government-funded	Atoms	for	Peace	pro-
gram.	Of	 the	young	trainees,	127,	 representing	57	percent	of	
237	total,	were	sent	overseas	and	many	went	to	the	United	King-
dom	through	funding	from	the	Korean	government.	Given	the	
penurious	conditions	of	the	time,	with	so	many	Koreans	still	go-
ing	hungry	and	in	tattered	clothes,	city	streets	pullulating	with	
war-wounded	and	orphans,	and	government	coffers	perennially	
empty,	the	commitment	to	spend	the	scarce	foreign	exchange	
resources	on	educating	these	young	Koreans	was	an	extraordi-
nary	step,	and	reflected	the	Korean	nation’s	eagerness	for	new	
technological	know-how	and	its	wish	to	quickly	rehabilitate	the	
war-ravaged	country.
These	 foreign-trained	 technical	personnel	 later	became	 the	
core	 of	 the	 Korean	 nuclear	 com-
munity,	and	preached	the	nuclear	
gospel	all	through	the	early,	empty,	
wilderness	years.	Of	course,	many,	
perhaps	a	 third	of	 the	 total,	were	
lost	through	leakage	as	they	opted	
to	 remain	 in	 the	 countries	where	
they	had	received	training,	to	work	
there	either	 in	 industry	or	 in	aca-
demia.	 This	 was	 a	 phenomenon	
experienced	 by	 many	 other	 less-
developed	 countries	 at	 the	 time,	
and	 much	 discussed	 later	 under	
the	rubric	of	the	“brain	drain.”
The	brain	drain	turned	out	in	ret-
rospect	 to	 be	 really	 a	 blessing	 in	
disguise,	because	these	profession-
als	kept	on	sharpening	their	exper-
tise	in	the	host	countries	only	to	be	tapped	later	on,	when	they	
returned	home	to	join	the	nuclear	projects	in	full	swing,	bring-
ing	with	them	much-needed	cutting-edge	technological	skills.	
Where	earlier	appeals	to	patriotism	and	homesickness	had	in-
sufficient	drawing	power,	a	tangible	project	commensurate	with	
a	suitable	posting	could	pull	these	ex-pats	back	home,	and	thus	
reverse	the	brain	drain.	The	material	conditions	had	to	be	right	
for	the	natural	reversal	of	the	brain	drain.
It	goes	without	saying	that	those	trained	in	Britain	favored	a	
gas-cooled	reactor,	while	the	beneficiaries	of	Uncle	Sam’s	lar-
gesse	 agitated	 for	 a	 light	water	 reactor.	 Since	U.K.-produced	
gas-cooled	reactors	were	already	deployed	in	Italy	and	Japan	at	
that	time,	the	British	model	enjoyed	a	winning	edge	at	first.	A	
dogfight	ensued,	pitting	the	one	competing	model	against	the	
other	and	involving	financial,	technical,	political,	and	diplomat-
ic	 interventions.	 Ultimately,	 though,	 the	 pro-American	 camp	
prevailed,	and	delivered	a	coup-de-grâce	to	the	efforts	of	the	al-
lied	European	consortium.	 In	hindsight	and	 from	a	 long-term	
Left:	After	years	of	
Japanese	occupa-
tion	and	then	a	
brutal	war,	Korea	
was	a	devastated	
country	in	the	
early	1950s.	Here,	
civilians	in	flight	
during	the	Korean	
War.
Below:	A	recent	
night	scene	of	
Seoul	City,	with	
illuminated	
buildings,	the	
sports	facility,	and	
city	streets.
National Archives and Records Administration 
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perspective,	this	was	a	fortunate	development,	I	must	say.
Later,	it	was	adjudged,	however,	that	the	light	water	reactor	
was	too	light	for	us,	so	a	decision	was	made	to	add	more	weight	
to	our	overall	nuclear	system	by	supplementing	it	with	a	heavy	
water	nuclear	machine.	Thus,	we	became	the	only	nation	in	the	
world	with	a	mix	of	light	and	heavy	water	reactor	types—that	is,	
until	China	came	along	and	followed	our	footsteps.
	These	days,	four	pressurized	heavy	water	reactors	are	in	full	
operation	 at	 the	Wolsung	 site.	 The	 name	Wolsung,	 literally	
meaning	Moon	Castle	or	Lunar	Citadel,	has	a	poetic	and	roman-
tic	resonance.	When	the	CANDU	reactor	was	introduced	to	Ko-
rea,	 some	wits	were	commenting	 that	whereas	 the	PWR	was	
akin	to	an	unexciting	de	jure	wife,	the	CANDU	at	Wolsung	was	
surely	like	a	beloved	concubine	with	whom	one	could	discuss	
high	art	and	literature	and	write	lofty	poetry	together	under	the	
moon-lit	castle.
With	the	introduction	of	CANDU,	the	2+1	nuclear	re-
actor	strategy	was	developed	in	Korea	under	the	direc-
tion	 of	 Dr.	 Kyung	 Ho	 Hyun,	 the	 former	 president	 of	
KAERI,	the	Korea	Atomic	Energy	Research	Institute.	This	
called	for	twin	units	of	the	PWR,	plus	one	CANDU,	in	
that	combination.	Intensive	R&D	work	led	later	to	the	
DUPIC	(Direct	Use	of	PWR	spent	fuel	In	a	CANDU	reac-
tor)	concept,	for	simultaneously	saving	natural	resources	
and	reducing	radiation	waste	volume.	On	the	other	side	
of	the	coin,	it	can	be	nothing	but	a	spread-too-thin	draw-
back	 of	 a	 nation’s	 technological	 potential	 if	 a	 small	
country	like	Korea	should	launch	into	the	pursuit	of	two	
reactor	types	from	the	beginning.
	After	long	pondering	and	in-depth	study,	the	Korean	
nuclear	 community	 decided	 to	 pursue	 a	 one-reactor-
type	strategy,	that	is,	the	PWR	alone.	The	deployment	of	
CANDU	reactors	was	terminated	with	the	fourth	CAN-
DU	unit	at	the	Wolsung	site.	This	CANDU	site	is	sched-
uled	to	have	new	family	members	bearing	different	no-
menclature:	 the	 Westinghouse	 APR	 1400	 (Advanced	
PWR	Reactor	1,400-MW-class)	and	a	radioactive	waste	
management	center.
To	 the	 great	 collective	 relief	 of	 the	 Korean	 nuclear	
community,	Wolsung	also	has	finally	been	selected	as	
the	 disposal	 site	 for	 low-	 and	medium-level	 radiation	
waste,	after	some	18	years	of	contentious	bickering	over	several	
different	possible	locations.	At	least,	we	were	fortunate	to	avoid	
a	Yucca	Mountain-type	debacle	seen	in	the	United	States	over	
site	selection.
The	Hare	and	the	Turtle
The	Western	nuclear	hares	sprinted	way	ahead,	just	as	the	Ko-
rean	turtle	was	crawling	to	the	starting	line.	Over	the	decades,	
the	world	witnessed	a	successful	transformation	of	nuclear	en-
ergy	applications	from	swords	to	plowshares,	that	is,	from	bombs	
to	power-generating	plants	such	as	CANDU	in	Canada,	LWRs	in	
the	United	States,	and	gas-cooled	reactors	in	Europe.	Even	when	
it	 owned	 zero	 hardware,	 the	 Korean	 turtle	 still	 assiduously	
prepped	for	the	future	by	learning	the	basic	software.	We	were	
fortunate	in	that	the	cream	of	the	Korean	academe	and	industry	
came	 knocking	 at	 our	 door:	 Probably,	many	were	muttering	
“open	sesame”	and	hoping	for	a	quantum	leap	both	in	their	sta-
tus	and	in	the	country’s	industrial	clout.
The	 recent	 scenery	 looks	 like	 that	depicted	 in	 the	cartoon,	
where	the	Western	hare	is	taking	a	nap	and	snoring	loudly	under	
a	big	tree	on	the	hillside,	and	just	coming	within	the	range	of	the	
turtle’s	sight.	Yet	the	Korean	turtle	still	keeps	crawling	toward	the	
high	mountain.
It	is	common	knowledge	that	a	turtle	enjoys	a	longer	life	than	
a	hare,	although	the	turtle’s	pace	is	slow.	So	far,	we	have	pursued	
a	 step-by-step	 route	 in	nuclear	 technology	development.	The	
most	important	knowledge	we	had	at	the	very	beginning	was	
the	self-knowledge	that	we	did	not	have	anything	and	we	knew	
nothing.	We	started,	indeed,	from	scratch.
Table	1
NUCLEAR	POWER	PROJECTS	VS.	TIME	
Period
 1960s
 1970s
 1980s
 1990s
 2000s
 2000s
Projects
Research reactor
Kori #1,2
Wolsung #1,2,3,4
Kori #3,4
Younggwang #1,2
Ulchin #1,2
Younggwang #3,4
OPR1000
Ulchin #3,4
Younggwang #5,6
Ulchin #5,6
Shin-Kori #3,4
(APR1400)
and henceforth
Main contractor
Foreign
suppliers
Foreign
suppliers
Foreign
suppliers
Domestic
suppliers
Domestic
suppliers
Domestic
suppliers
Implementation method
Cradle, spoon-feeding,
technology learning
by eyes and ears
Turn-key contract
Non-turnkey and
component approach
Component approach, but
foreign firm responsible
for design, supply, and
performance
Component approach,
domestic firm responsible
for design, supply, and
performance
System upgrading;
looking for
foreign markets
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Table	1	(p.	33)	shows	in	chronological	order	our	development	
path	with	respect	to	nuclear	projects.
	Training	and	Work	Performance
The	Korean	nuclear	sector	has	long	regarded	manpower	train-
ing	as	priority	Number	1.	The	training	(and	subsequent	retrain-
ing)	of	a	top-notch	nuclear	engineer	in	Korea	usually	costs	an	
amount	 equivalent	 to	 his	 body	 weight	 in	 gold.	The	 amount	
comes	to	about	50	percent	of	the	cost	incurred	in	training	a	full-
fledged	pilot	in	the	Air	Force	and	in	the	aviation	industry,	and	
much	less	than	that	for	an	astronaut	training,	yet	it	is	a	big	bur-
den	on	 the	project	director,	 especially	 insofar	 as	most	of	 the	
training	must	be	undertaken	far	in	advance.
Because	of	this,	we	sometimes	jokingly	refer	to	a	good	nucle-
ar	engineer	as	“Mr.	Gold.”	And,	as	you	know,	the	most	common	
last	name	in	Korea	is	Kim	which	means	gold.	We	deploy	many	
“Mr.	Golds”	in	planning,	design,	manufacture,	construction,	op-
eration,	maintenance,	inspection	and	safety	analysis	for	nuclear	
projects,	along	with	many	more	“Mr.	Silvers”	and	“Mr.	Coppers”	
in	supporting	roles	who	man	our	laboratories,	offices,	and	plant	
sites.
Many	of	our	“Mr.	Golds”	and	their	supporting	cast	put	in	12-
hour	workdays	and	seven-day	work	weeks.	It	has	been	carried	
out	in	a	pattern	of	Monday-Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday-Thurs-
day-Friday-Friday	work.	Senior	members	in	our	nuclear	sector	
have	a	sort	of	intimate	feeling	toward	a	convenience	store	enti-
tled	Seven-Eleven,	which	connotes	from	7	o’clock	in	the	morn-
ing	to	11	o’clock	at	night.
Our	plant	managers	sometimes	resort	to	non-traditional	meth-
ods	to	focus	the	minds	of	their	staffs.	A	manager	by	the	name	of	
Young	Suk	Huh,	for	example,	packed	off	his	men	to	a	Marine	
Corps	training	camp	to	toughen	their	physical	and	mental	en-
durance.	 Even	 those	who	were	 initially	 reluctant	 to	 join	 the	
camp	later	expressed	their	great	satisfaction	at	having	complet-
ed	the	tough	training,	saying	that	they	are	now	better	prepared	
for	difficult	tasks	and	challenges	at	work.
In	January	2007,	29	of	KOPEC’s	new	recruits	were	sent	straight	
to	a	Marine	Corps	camp	to	put	them	in	tiptop	shape	(KOPEC	
stands	for	Korea	Power	Engineering	Co.).	All	the	new	recruits	of	
KAERI,	the	Korea	Atomic	Energy	Research	Institute,	headed	by	
Dr.	Chang	Kyu	Park,	were	also	sent	to	a	Marine	Corps	training	
camp	for	tough	drill.
Another	unique	training	procedure	had	reactor	operators	and	
technical	crew	at	a	Buddhist	temple	for	meditation	sessions	and	
Unit	electricity	rates	in	Korea	are	lower	for	the	poor	and	
higher	 for	 the	wealthy—the	opposite	of	 the	 rates	 in	many	
other	 places.	The	 figure	 shows	 the	 unit	 electricity	 rate	 (in	
won)	imposed	on	residential	customers	at	six	selective	elec-
tric	utilities	in	the	world.	Two	utilities	show	distinctive	fea-
tures:	One	is	Con	Ed,	where	the	unit	electricity	rate	is	295	
won/kWh	when	its	consumption	is	220	kWh,	while	the	rate	
goes	down	to	240	won/kWh	if	the	consumption	is	600	kWh.	
This	means	that	a	high	unit	rate	is	imposed	on	smaller	con-
sumers,	while	there	is	a	low	rate	on	larger	consumers.
The	other	 is	 the	Korean	 case,	where	 the	unit	 electricity	
rates	are	opposite	to	Con	Ed:	There	are	low	unit	rates	to	small-
er	users	(poor	people),	and	high	rates	to	
larger	customers	(rich	people).
For	 instance,	 the	electricity	rate	 im-
posed	on	rich	people	 living	 in	deluxe	
houses	 consuming	much	 electricity	 is	
about	2.8	times	the	unit	electricity	rate	
imposed	on	 lesser	 users	 of	 electricity,	
who	may	be	poor	people.	Please	bear	
in	mind	that	the	electric	bill	to	the	high-
income	 bracket	 may	 be	 insignificant,	
but	it	can	be	a	financial	burden	to	the	
poor	and	needy.
Therefore,	 I	 strongly	 recommend	
this	 Korean	 system	 to	 the	 Electricity	
Commission	 (Board)	 or	 government	
authorities	 of	 other	 countries,	 which	
may	 thus	 suppress	 electricity	 con-
sumption	 by	 self-regulated	 mecha-
nisms	in	the	luxurious	residential	sec-
tor,	as	well	as	indirectly	mitigating	the	
financial	 burden	 of	 poor	 families,	
whose	purses	are	now	squeezed	by	the	
electricity	bill.
UNIT	ELECTRICITY	RATES	IMPOSED	ON	RESIDENTIAL	CONSUMERS	PER	
kWh	AT	SELECTED	UTILITIES
Two	singularities	are	evident:	KEPCO’s	rates	are	the	lowest	for	the	small	users	and	
highest	for	the	large	consumers,	while	Con	Edison’s	rates	are	the	highest	for	the	
small	consumers,	and	lower	for	large	consumers.
kWh
A	Fair	System	of	Electricity	Rates
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for	open-minded	discussions	with	the	reverend	monks.	This	idea	
was	also	strongly	opposed	by	employees	at	first,	for	many	rea-
sons,	 but	 especially	 on	 religious	 grounds.	However,	Mr.	 Suk	
Chun	Suh,	 the	director	of	 the	Wolsung	plant	 site,	who	 intro-
duced	this	training	methodology,	was	able	to	assuage	the	initial	
skepticism	and	persuade	the	employees	to	give	it	a	try.	The	suc-
cess	of	his	persuasion	was	attributed	to	his	non-religious	attitude	
and	atheistic	inclination.	The	meditation	training	had	a	good	ef-
fect,	and	made	these	employees	sharper	mentally	to	tackle	work,	
especially	in	stressful	emergency	situations.
Such	 intensive	and	extraordinary	 training	has	 resulted	 in	a	
good	harvest,	that	is,	in	the	tangible	form	of	operating	perfor-
mance	of	power	reactors,	that	has	been	above	a	90	percent	ca-
pacity	 factor	over	 the	past	seven	consecutive	years,	and	a	15	
percent	better	capacity	factor	than	the	world	average	over	the	
past	two	decades	In	comparative	terms	of	investment	and	return,	
pre-investment	for	manpower	training	in	timely	manner	can	be	
a	lucrative	venture.
The	improved	revenue	as	the	result	of	having	achieved	a	bet-
ter	capacity	factor	of	our	20	power	reactors	can	be	calculated	as	
$9	billion	in	2004,	$8	billion	in	2005,	and	$8	billion	in	2006.
The	physical	protection	of	nuclear	facilities	has	long	been	a	
focal	point	of	concern	for	the	Korean	nuclear	community.	Our	
sense	of	vulnerability	was	driven	home	especially	hard	in	the	
aftermath	of	North	Korea’s	bloody	acts	of	rampaging	terrorism	
during	the	1970s.	Just	to	mention	two	cases:	There	was	the	mas-
sacre	of	17	dignitaries,	such	as	several	cabinet	members	of	the	
Korean	government	in	Rangoon,	Myanmar	(Burma).	(The	terror-
ists	were	targetting	the	President	and	nearly	got	him,	too.)	And,	
there	was	the	blowing-up	of	the	Korean	Airlines	plane	carrying	
some	120	Korean	workers	who	were	returning	home	from	con-
struction	sites	in	the	Middle	East,	simply	to	jeopardize	the	1988	
Seoul	Olympiad.
Because	of	the	terrorist	behavior	of	the	North	Korean	regime,	
we	in	the	south	have	had	to	strengthen	and	constantly	upgrade	
the	protection	features	for	our	national	security	assets,	includ-
ing	nuclear	facilities.	Long	before	the	Sept.	11	disaster,	North	
Korean	threats	made	us	sensitive	to	a	possible	Al	Qaeda-type	
attack	 on	 our	 critical	 installations,	 including	 nuclear	 power	
plants.	In	response,	we	have	had	to	put	in	place	extra-security	
shields	and	monitoring,	and	we	are	confident	that	our	nuclear	
installations	can	be	run	safely	and	efficiently,	free	from	these	
external	menaces.
From	1984	to	the	end	of	2004,	the	price	index	of	general	com-
modities	in	Korea	saw	a	rise	of	184.8	percent.	During	this	same	
period,	the	electricity	price	index	rose	by	only	5.4	percent.	The	
availability	of	relatively	cheap	electricity	in	Korea,	which	is	the	
result	in	large	part	of	the	excellent	performance	in	power	gen-
eration,	especially	from	nuclear	reactors,	is	the	main	contribu-
tive	factor	to	this	benefit.	Korea’s	electricity	sector	has	managed	
to	maintain	a	top-class	standard	in	power	supply	quality,	both	in	
voltage	and	in	frequency	stability	terms,	meeting	99.99	percent	
of	requirements.
However,	we	do	not	bask	in	self-congratulatory	complacency	
with	this	high	performance;	we	think	that	there	is	still	room	for	
further	improvement.	We	should	be	able	to	squeeze	out	even	
better	productivity,	 for	example,	by	working	on	our	relatively	
long	overhaul	and	maintenance	periods.
Construction	Innovations
When	it	comes	to	construction	periods,	Korea	still	lags	behind	
those	of	 the	nuclear	hares.	The	construction	 repetition	of	 the	
same	reactor	capacity	with	identical	design	has	always	resulted	
in	shortening	the	construction	period	by	a	few	months	per	proj-
ect.	The	 construction	 periods	 for	 the	 ongoing	 Shin-Kori	 and	
Shin-Wolsung	projects	are	presumed	to	be	3	months	less	than	
that	of	the	previous	project	(Ulchin	No.	5,6);	that	is,	from	56	to	
53	months.	All	the	reactors	listed	in	Table	2	are	1,000-MW	pres-
surized	water	reactors,	except	for	Shin-Kori	3	and	4,	which	are	
of	the	PWR	1,400-MW-class,	or	the	so-called	APR	1400	type.
One	thing	we	are	satisfied	with	is	the	improving	trend	in	this	
area.	As	we	climb	the	learning	curve	with	ever	more	projects	
under	our	belt,	the	construction	periods	are	getting	shortened:	
for	 instance,	 from	64	months	 for	 the	YGN	 (Younggwang)	3,4	
project,	 to	56	months	 for	 the	more	recent	Ulchin	5,6	project	
(Table	 2).	Through	 further	 performance-enabling	 incremental	
breakthroughs,	we	think	that	in	time	we	can	reach	the	construc-
tion	period	target	of	under	4	years	per	project.
Korean	shipbuilders	have	been	able	to	develop	an	innovation	
that	has	meant	great	savings	in	time,	manpower,	cost,	and	space	
at	the	job	site.	The	novel	procedure	involved	fabricating	mod-
ules	offsite,	and	then	bringing	them	together	for	assembly	at	the	
dock	site,	whose	availability	was	at	a	premium.	This	modulariza-
tion	technique	was	a	straight	borrowing	from	the	construction	
experience	at	one	of	our	nuclear	plants,	where	the	calandria	(re-
actor	core)	of	the	CANDU	reactor	was	fabricated	nearby	in	ad-
vance	and	then	transported	by	rail	track	into	the	containment	
building.
And	Korean	shipbuilders	are	now	using	such	modularization	
technology	on	 land	 to	assemble	container	 ships	 that	are	200	
meters	long	and	15	stories	high,	before	towing	them	out	to	sea	
on	rail	tracks.	Korean	shipbuilders	use	the	word	“block”	instead	
Table	2
ACTUAL	CONSTRUCTION	PERIODS	AND	TARGETS
(In	months)
Project Target Record
YGN* Units 3, 4 64 63, 67
Ulchin 3, 4 62 61, 73
YGN 5, 6 58 59, 61
Ulchin 5, 6 56 58,55
Shin-Kori 1, 2 53 
Shin-Wolsung 1, 2 53 
Shin-Kori 3, 4 58  
*YGN = Younggwang Units
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of	“module,”	which	is	the	terminology	used	in	our	nuclear	com-
munity.	The	shipbuilders	have	steadily	stepped	up	the	size	of	the	
block	unit	from	a	500-ton	block	to	more	than	2,000-ton	giga-
block	so	as	to	optimize	shipbuilding	work	and	to	shorten	the	
construction	time.
A	friend	of	mine,	Dr.	D.S.	Shin,	who	is	known	as	the	godfather	
of	the	Korean	shipbuilding	community,	has	been	involved	in	this	
block-assembly	project	as	a	naval	architect.	He	said	the	other	
day	that	a	dozen	pieces	of	gigablocks	for	a	300,000-ton	oil	tank-
er	are	now	assembled	at	dock	in	26	days—the	world-record	in	
shipbuilding	history.
Because	 of	 these	 assembly	 techniques,	 a	 300,000-ton	 oil	
tanker	is	built	at	a	Korean	shipyard	within	seven	months	from	
the	first	cutting	of	steel	plate	to	the	final	launching	of	the	tanker	
out	to	the	sea.	He	said	further	improvement	in	block	unit	system,	
assembly	work,	 and	 construction	 time	 is	 being	 pursued.	The	
construction	time	of	the	same	tonnage	tanker	at	the	shipyards	in	
other	countries	is	said	to	be	in	the	range	of	1	to	2	years,	but	it	is	
becoming	shorter	each	year.
Another	 time-saving	 technique	 can	 be	 learned	 from	 steel	
structure	 assembly	 work	 at	 the	 construction	 site	 of	 high-rise	
buildings.	The	conventional	method	has	been	to	first	dig	out	the	
ground,	fabricate	the	underground	steel	structure,	and	then	start	
assembling	the	steel	structure	above	ground.
My	kid	brother,	a	structural	engineer,	was	the	first	to	adopt	a	
new	technique	in	this	area,	the	so-called	“Top-Down”	method,	
wherein	steel	frame	assembly	work	proceeds	above	ground	and	
below	ground	simultaneously.	By	relying	on	this	simultaneous	
assembly	work,	he	usually	saves	20	percent	of	the	steel	structure	
assembly	time.
I	think	it	is	now	time	for	the	nuclear	sector	to	benchmark	the	
above	shipbuilding	technology	and	steel-frame	assembly	tech-
niques	so	as	to	shorten	the	construction	time	of	nuclear	power	
plants.	In	a	nuclear	power	plant,	a	one-day	delay	in	the	con-
struction	stage	now	equals	more	than	a	$1	million	dollar	loss	to	
its	operator.
Key	Issues	in	Nuclear	Project	Development
In	my	view,	 the	main	 lessons	 learned	 from	Korea’s	nuclear	
project	development	experience	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
•	Long-term	Planning	and	Its	Implementation
In	Korea,	the	long-term	nuclear	power	development	program	
was	drawn	up	in	the	early	1960s,	when	electric	power	was	in	
short	supply,	and	the	nation’s	total	electric	grid	was	too	small	to	
accommodate	even	the	smallest	nuclear	power	plant	unit.	But	
there	was	a	consensus	among	the	ruling	elite,	as	well	as	among	
the	public,	that	the	dire	power	shortage	problem	had	to	be	tack-
led	 by	whatever	measure	 necessary,	 and	 nuclear	 power	was	
considered	a	breakthough	solution.
Over	the	years,	the	original	development	plan	was	modified	a	
number	of	times	to	be	consonant	with	the	progress	of	reactor	
commercialization	in	advanced	countries.	In	time,	Korea’s	role	
flipped	from	that	of	a	recipient	to	one	of	a	supplier	of	nuclear	
technology.	The	remarkable	transformation	took	three	decades	
of	toil,	sweat,	brainpower,	and	the	mobilization	of	many	dedi-
cated	people	in	the	industry.
•	 	Continued	Training	of	Good-Quality	Manpower
When	our	nuclear	power	development	program	was	in	the	
conception	 stage	 in	 the	 late	1950s,	Korea	was	 just	 emerging	
from	a	devastating	civil	war.	People	were	in	tattered	clothes	and	
hungry,	the	government	coffers	were	near-empty,	and	the	streets	
were	full	of	begging	orphans,	destitute	widows,	and	limbless	ex-
soldiers.
Yet	 there	were	young	Koreans	whose	audacious	dream	for	
the	nation	involved	nuclear	power,	those	who	looked	to	nucle-
ar	energy	to	rehabilitate	the	war-torn	nation,	as	well	as	to	nur-
ture	 their	 careers.	 It	was	with	 the	 recruiting	 of	 these	 people	
(most	of	them	had	just	completed	their	mandatory	military	con-
scription	duties)	 that	 the	Office	of	Atomic	Energy	and	KAERI	
were	established.
In	 order	 to	 attract	 and	 retain	 the	 best-quality	 manpower,	
KAERI	kept	 its	 salaries	at	an	extraordinarily	generous	 level	of	
300	percent	of	that	for	ordinary	government	officials.	Through	
government	and	U.S.	funding	aid,	a	number	of	young	scientists	
and	engineers	had	already	been	sent	abroad	 to	 receive	basic	
training	in	nuclear	technology.	These	foreign-trained	cadre	con-
stituted	the	original	core	of	KAERI’s	personnel.
New	recruits	to	KAERI	were	given	basic	training.	After	that,	
many	were	sent	abroad	for	additional	training,	which,	on	aver-
age,	lasted	one	year.	In	accordance	with	the	old	adage,	“strike	
while	the	iron	is	hot,”	new	trainees	were	constantly	sent	to	sem-
inars	and	workshops,	in	addition	to	participating	in	the	in-house	
training	courses	organized	by	the	seniors.
The	oldest	and	the	most	active	nuclear	training	center	is	the	
one	that	was	established	at	KAERI,	and	it	has	been	the	delivery	
clinic,	incubator,	nursery,	kindergarten,	and	school	for	Korean	
nuclear	personnel	as	well	as	for	those	from	abroad.	In	the	year	
2005,	KAERI’s	Nuclear	Training	Center	 (KAERI-NTC)	offered	
36	 domestic	 courses	 to	 1,580	 persons	 and	 9	 international	
courses	to	116	foreign	individuals,	and	it	managed	one	inter-
national	 seminar	 attended	 by	 122	 participants.	The	 courses	
conducted	in	the	year	2005	include:	Radioisotope	Utilization	
Technology,	Radiation-Hazards	Protection,	IAEA/KOICA	Train-
ing	 Course	 on	 Nuclear	 Power	 Policy,	 Planning	 and	 Project	
Management.
Since	 the	NTC’s	 dormitory	 capacity	 can	 accommodate	 48	
trainees	 at	maximum,	 participants	 in	 larger	 courses	must	 be	
lodged	in	outside	hotels.	The	Nuclear	Training	Center	of	KHNP	
is	better	furnished	and	well	equipped,	and	it	is	sometimes	open	
to	international	courses.
In	addition,	each	power	station	has	its	own	training	center	fur-
nished	with	respective	simulators	and	experienced	faculty	mem-
bers.	KOPEC,	the	Korea	Power	Engineering	Company,	an	archi-
tect-engineering	 firm	 responsible	 for	 the	 design	 of	 nuclear	
power	plants;	KEPOS,	 a	power	plant	maintenance	company;	
KINS,	 the	nuclear	regulatory	and	licensing	agency;	and	other	
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outfits	operate	these	training	centers.
•	Technical	Backup	by	R&D
Because	the	nuclear	sector	is	a	knowledge-based	industry,	the	
technical	problems	encountered	usually	call	 for	technical	ex-
pertise	for	resolution.	When	problems	arise,	the	quickest	solu-
tion	is	to	resort	to	foreign	consultants	and	engineering	compa-
nies.	This	approach,	however,	can	be	costly,	 time-consuming	
and,	above	all,	it	will	not	engender	the	local	accumulation	and	
accretion	of	technical	expertise	that	should	result	from	working	
on	various	problems	and	issues.
			Given	all	this,	it	is	best	to	adopt	a	do-it-yourself	approach	
wherein	a	technical	group	is	empowered	to	tackle	the	various	
problems	that	will	inevitably	arise.	This	technical	group,	how-
ever,	can	only	succeed	if	there	is	an	effective	R&D	backup	that	
can	be	called	in	to	help	address	the	most	intractable	of	prob-
lems.
Again,	dedicated	and	high-quality	 research	manpower	 is	a	
prerequisite	for	the	success	of	the	local	go-it-alone	approach.	
The	 nuclear-related	 organizations	 in	 Korea	 operate	 in-house	
training	centers	and	research	centers	for	the	technical	upkeep	
and	innovation	of	their	employees	and	new	recruits.	Some	orga-
nizations	offer	evening	classes	on	specific	topics	to	their	mem-
bers,	either	by	inviting	outside	experts	or	professors	and/or	in-
house	professional	seniors.	In	the	case	of	reactor	operators,	one	
of	six	shifts	is	always	sent	to	a	training	center,	while	another	shift	
is	deployed	to	a	technical	evaluation	&	maintenance	group	at	
the	site.
			Securing	top-notch	expertise	is	the	prime	measure	for	bring-
ing	 forth	 the	 vitality	 of	 our	 industry	 and	 eventually	 bringing	
about	 the	 next	 nuclear	 renaissance.	 To	 this	 end,	 continued	
changes	toward	innovation	and	betterment	will	be	the	key	words	
that	describe	the	nuclear	community	of	today.	It	is	the	growth	
engine	that	powers	our	future	technology,	keeping	our	caliber	
always	at	the	competitive	edge.
•	 	Step-by-Step	Development	of	a	Technological	Self-Reliance	
Capability
In	the	sciences,	we	sometimes	see	quantum	leaps	in	under-
standing	and	radical	shifts	in	paradigms;	for	example,	the	revo-
lutionary	shift	from	Newtonian	science	to	quantum	physics.	The	
philosopher	of	 science	Thomas	Kuhn	wrote	about	 such	para-
digm	shifts.	In	engineering,	however,	advancement	tends	to	be	
incremental	in	nature,	and	the	gradualist	modus	operandi	is	the	
way	to	go.	Here,	the	persistence	of	a	turtle,	moving	at	what	ap-
pears	to	be	a	glacial	pace,	is	often	the	guarantor	of	sure	success.	
It	is	the	small	details	and	constant	improvement	in	all	areas,	like	
developing	capable	and	experienced	personnel	and	honing	in-
house	 engineering	 and	 R&D	 capability,	 which	 will	 make	 or	
break	a	nuclear	power	project.	And	such	capability	cannot	be	
willed	into	existence	overnight;	it	has	to	be	the	result	of	years	of	
gradual	accumulation	and	accrual	of	know-how,	and	constant	
training	and	re-training	of	personnel.
			Our	experience	tells	us	that	the	most	cost-	and	technology-
effective	way	of	implementing	the	first	one	or	two	nuclear	pow-
er	projects	is	to	rely	on	a	turn-key	contract,	structured	in	such	a	
way	as	to	ensure	maximum	deployment	of	local	input	(ensuring	
on-the-job	training	for	locals	and	transfers	of	know-how),	while	
the	supplier	still	shoulders	all	the	responsibility	from	alpha	to	
omega.	The	other	side	of	the	coin	is	that	the	recipient	must	keep	
The	Korean	King,	his	cabinet	members,	and	subjects	witnessing	the	first	electric	light	lit	at	his	majesty’s	Royal	Palace	on	March	6,	
1887.	William	McKay,	an	American	engineer,	installed	the	electric	bulbs	at	the	royal	palace	in	Seoul,	7	years	and	5	months	after	
Thomas	Edison’s	invention	of	the	electric	bulb.	The	bulbs	arrived	some	2	1/2	years	after	the	order	for	them	had	been	placed.	Nev-
ertheless,	April	10	was	later	promulgated	as	the	official	Electricity	Day	in	Korea	in	recognition	that	the	general	populace	began	ben-
efitting	from	electricity	as	of	that	day	in	1890.
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his	eyes	wide	open	to	the	work	progress	and	completion	and,	
through	surveillance,	inspection,	and	testing,	must	confirm	that	
the	supplier’s	work	conforms	to	the	expected	level.	The	recipient	
must	be	a	constant	watchdog.
			Once	on	the	learning	curve,	the	interactive	and	on-the-job	
aspects	 of	 the	 projects	 pushed	 us	 quickly	 up	 the	 admittedly	
steep	learning	curve,	as	this	chronology	shows:
1970-1986:	Acquisition	of	basic	technology
1986-1995:	Buildup	of	technological	self-reliance	capability	
through	project	repetitions
1992-2001:	Development	of	next-generation	reactors
1999-2006:	Enhancement	of	nuclear	power	technology	with	
emphasis	on	core	technology	development
2007:	 Basic	 buildup	 for	 nuclear	 technology	 advancement	
and	preparations	for	plant	export.
•	 Construction	Management
No	manual	 or	 textbook	 on	 construction	management	 and	
project	 scheduling	can	hope	 to	match	 the	direct	 tutorial	 and	
hands-on	involvement	of	an	experienced	project	manager	or	a	
professional	project	scheduler	from	offshore,	and	this	is	espe-
cially	 true	 for	 the	very	first	nuclear	power	plant	construction	
projects.	The	experienced	foreign	professionals	can	guide	 the	
locals	on	 the	well-trodden	path	of	power	plant	 construction,	
saving	the	locals	from	having	to	reinvent	the	wheel	every	so	of-
ten.	Repetitive	trials	and	errors	can	be	avoided,	and	the	project	
can	be	finished	on	a	timely	basis	and	on	budget.
When	it	comes	to	hiring	outside	help,	we	recommend	top-
notch	consultants,	even	if	it	means	bigger	outlays	in	fees	and	
salaries.	 Pennywise	 and	 pound	 foolish	 is	 an	 apt	 maxim	 to	
hearken	to	here,	and	we	all	know	how	bad	consulting	advice	
can	 lead	 to	millions	of	dollars	 in	problems	 to	fix	down	 the	
road.
Korea’s	first	and	second	nuclear	power	projects	were	under-
taken	on	a	turn-key	contract	basis.	The	suppliers	were	fully	re-
sponsible	from	design	to	test	operation,	and	the	projects	were	
completed	within	schedule	and	budget.	Korean	engineers	and	
technicians	were	involved	in	every	step	of	the	process,	and	they	
were	eager	to	learn	and	absorb	the	tangible	know-how	from	the	
foreign	suppliers.	The	deployment	of	Korean	personnel	in	every	
aspect	of	the	project	meant,	too,	that	the	suppliers	could	realize	
a	saving	in	their	personnel	expenses.
In	short,	it	was	a	win-win	situation	for	both	parties:	The	sup-
plier	could	 save	 in	personnel	deployment,	while	 the	buyers’	
personnel	 could	 become	 proficient	 in	 the	 new	 technology	
through	on-the-project	participation.	This	on-the-job	learning	
gave	us	not	only	new	knowledge	but	also	fomented	within	us	a	
determined	self-confidence	necessary	for	confronting	the	sub-
sequent	projects	which	we,	for	the	most	part,	carried	out	on	our	
own.
After	the	completion	of	first	two	turn-key	projects	of	the	nu-
clear	 power	 plants	 in	 Korea,	 the	 construction	 company	 dis-
patched	many	of	its	engineers	to	KAERI	for	training	in	nuclear	
basics	and	the	concept	of	quality	control	and	quality	assurance	
systems.	Needless	to	say,	this	construction	company	has	been	
the	most	successful	bidder	in	the	public	bidding	for	many	sub-
sequent	nuclear	power	plant	construction	projects.	And	this	par-
ticular	firm	has	grown	to	be	one	of	the	top-notch	construction-
engineering	companies	 in	 the	world	market	 in	 terms	of	work	
progress,	quality,	and	amount	of	contracts.
When	 I	was	 an	 engineering	 student,	 I	was	 very	 impressed	
with	the	following	lecture	from	a	much	experienced	professor:	
It	was	something	to	do	with	the	reshuffling	scheme	of	plant	man-
agers	 along	 with	 the	 progress	 of	 construction	 and	 operation	
phases	of	thermal	power	plants:
CONSTRUCTION	PHASES	AND	THE	PREFERABLE
	CORRESPONDING	PLANT	MANAGERS
Phase Plant manager
Site preparation, building Civil engineer
Equipment installation Mechanical engineer
From test operation to initial operation for some years Electrical engineer 
After some years of initial operation to the end of plant life Chemist
The	professor	stressed	the	importance	of	water	chemistry	and	
corrosion	control	of	 the	materials	 in	a	power	plant	 time	and	
again,	saying	that	the	availability	of	the	power	plant	is	greatly	
dependent	on	the	control	of	water	quality	and	the	preventive	
measures	against	material	corrosion.	I	think	that	this	point	is	not	
only	limited	to	a	thermal	power	plant	but	also	to	a	nuclear	pow-
er	plant	as	well.
•	 Measures	for	Winning	Public	Acceptance
In	any	society,	one	finds	ardent	supporters	for	national	nucle-
ar	projects	as	well	as	activists	agitating	against	them.	The	gen-
eral	public,	for	the	most	part,	remains	unperturbed,	neutral,	and	
non-biased.	The	proportions	of	each	group	tend	to	fall	in	place	
in	a	bell	curve.
Professional	anti-nuclear	people	are	bold,	quick	to	act,	and	
internationally	well-connected.	They	do	not	shirk	from	aggres-
sive	tactics.	Above	all,	they	are	clever	with	presenting	nonsensi-
cal	data	in	plausible	terms,	and	they	seek	to	provoke.	It	is	diffi-
cult	to	win	a	public	debate	against	them	since	they	are	quick	to	
counter	our	arguments	with	unfounded	facts	and	data.	The	long	
and	strenuous	efforts	of	the	Korean	nuclear	community	to	en-
gage	and	win	over	these	radical	anti-nuclear	activists	through	
rational	discourse	have	not	borne	any	fruit.	All	our	sincere	and	
time-consuming	face-to-face	discussions	with	them	have	failed	
totally.
What	we	have	learned	is	that	in	order	to	win	wide	public	
acceptance	of	nuclear	power,	we	must	focus	on	the	unthink-
ing	general	public	in	the	middle:	the	housewives,	students,	
children	 and,	 especially,	 those	 in	 the	 mass-media,	 rather	
than	waste	our	time	wrestling	mano-a-mano	with	incorrigi-
ble	anti-nuke	activists.	A	winning	campaign	will	require	our	
total	 commitment	 for	 the	 long	haul,	with	 lots	of	patience,	
sincerity,	and,	of	course,	uncontestable	facts	and	data	with	
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which	to	present	our	claims.
Using	straightforward	and	simple	language,	we	must	appeal	
to	reason	and	common	sense,	and	make	a	case	for	how	nucle-
ar	technology	can	ensure	environmental	conservation	and	at	
the	same	time	provide	a	stable	energy	supply	for	now	and	for	
future	generations.	Hearts	and	minds	must	be	won	over	from	
an	early	age	and	one	of	our	long-term	strategies	is	to	encode	
the	concept	of	nuclear	energy	benefitting	human	civilization	
and	kindling	electric	candles	for	our	offspring	in	textbooks	at	
all	levels.
	Technological	Self-Reliance	Capability
In	retrospect,	Korea’s	pace	toward	a	self-reliance	capability	
for	developing	nuclear	technology	has	been	slow	but	persistent	
over	the	years.	It	was	fortunate	that	continued	efforts	have	been	
dauntlessly	employed	in	step-by-step	fashion.
First	was	the	learning	process	of	practical	know-how	from	
the	mentors,	either	in	the	form	of	training	courses	at	home	and	
abroad	or	on-the-job	training	at	the	sites,	and	second	was	the	
endeavor	 for	 developing	basic	 software	 and	hardware	 tech-
nologies.	This	was	followed	by	the	third	step,	which	is	the	tan-
gible	realization	of	design-engineering-manufacturing	as	well	
as	system	analysis	of	necessary	systems.	Here	are	some	of	the	
major	footprints	regarding	the	technological	development	of	
domestic	capability	in	the	nuclear	sector.
•	 CANDU	Fuel	Development
Technological	 self-reliance,	or	 so-called	 technical	 localiza-
tion,	has	been	a	magic	word	in	the	Korean	nuclear	community.	
First	of	 the	all-out	endeavors	 for	 the	localization	commenced	
with	the	development	of	CANDU	fuel	at	Korea	Atomic	Energy	
Research	Institute	in	the	late	1970s.	Our	researchers	and	engi-
neers	employed	their	utmost	efforts	at	this,	working	12	hours	per	
day	and	7	days	a	week,	around	the	year.
As	the	result	of	their	endeavor	at	home	and	in	Canada,	KAERI	
people	succeeded	in	designing	CANDU	fuel	bundles,	and	then	
approached	AECL	 (Atomic	Energy	of	Canada	Limited)	 for	 the	
use	of	CANDU	 fuel	 technology.	AECL,	 the	Atomic	 Energy	of	
Canada,	Ltd.,		claimed	$26	million	of	it.
There	were	lengthy	vis-à-vis	negotiations	between	KAERI	re-
searchers	and	AECL	staff	involving	the	proprietary	information	
issue.	During	 the	 negotiation	 process,	 Canadians	 recognized	
that	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 KAERI	 researchers	 possessed	 sufficient	
CANDU	fuel	design	know-why	and	know-how,	almost	every-
thing	 from	 its	 alpha	 to	omega,	meant	 that	 there	was	nothing	
much	to	be	transferred	to	the	technology	recipient.	As	a	symbol,	
however,	AECL	requested	$1.00	from	KAERI	for	the	use	of	the	
CANDU	fuel	design	technology.
We	still	feel	extremely	grateful	to	our	AECL	partners	for	their	
generosity	in	this	regard.	It	was	our	first	step	toward	the	nuclear	
technology	self-reliance	avenue.
The	second	step	was	the	actual	fabrication	and	test-proof	of	
the	CANDU	 fuel	 bundles.	 Because	 it	was	mandatory	 for	 the	
KAERI-made	fuel	bundles	to	be	test-proven	under	the	actual	op-
erating	conditions	for	their	integrity	before	being	loaded	into	a	
CANDU	reactor,	KAERI	was	obliged	to	ask	AECL	for	help.
The	Korean-made	fuel	bundles	had	to	be	tested	at	NRU,	a	ma-
terials-testing	reactor	in	Canada.	The	test	fee	quoted	from	Cana-
da	was	$3	million,	which	was,	however,	 far	more	 than	what	
KAERI	had	in	its	coffers.	In	fact,	KAERI	had	only	$0.4	million	for	
it.	 Eventually,	 the	 three-day	 negotiation	 between	 AECL	 and	
KAERI	was	broken	off,	and	the	KAERI	delegation	went	out	 to	
Montreal	Airport	to	return	home	in	despondency.
But	while	the	Korean	delegates	were	waiting	for	the	board-
ing	announcement,	they	were	abruptly	visited	by	AECL’s	vice	
president,	who	graciously	conveyed	the	word	that	the	Cana-
dian	government	had	authorized	AECL	to	sign	the	contract	for	
the	 irradiation	 of	 KAERI-made	 fuel	 bundles	 at	 NRU	 at	
$400,000.
Thus	the	contract	was	signed	at	Montreal	Airport	on	Oct.	5,	
1982.
Canada’s	favor	was	not	limited	only	to	the	exceptional	reduc-
tion	of	the	contract	amount	but	also	extended	to	invisible	sup-
port	for	R&D	activities	in	this	regard:	Under	the	positive	coop-
eration	of	Canadian	colleagues,	three	Korean-made	fuel	bundles	
were	loaded	in	the	NRU	reactor	for	a	seven-month	test	period.	
During	the	test	period,	all	kinds	of	test	data	were	obtained	by	the	
measuring	instruments	of	the	Canadian	laboratory,	with	the	help	
of	Canadian	colleagues.
In	 June	1984,	 the	 fully	 tested	 fuel	bundles	were	discharged	
from	the	NRU	reactor,	and	the	result	was	more	than	satisfactory.
Our	track	record	attests	to	the	fact	that	CANDU	fuel	develop-
ment	was	Korea’s	major	march	toward	the	lengthy	technological	
self-reliance	path	for	the	development	of	nuclear	software	and	
hardware.	The	expenditure	KAERI	put	up	for	CANDU	fuel	devel-
opment	was	merely	0.3	percent	of	what	the	Canadian	developer	
had	initially	invested	for	this	fuel	development.
•	 PWR	Fuel	Development
Of	the	operating	power	reactor	fleet,	16	out	of	20	reactors	in	
Korea	belong	to	PWR	type,	purchased	from	two	different	coun-
tries,	 the	U.S.A.	and	France.	Since	PWR	 fuel	 is	made	of	en-
riched	uranium,	the	related	technical	specifications	are	com-
plex	 and	more	 stringent	 compared	 to	 other	 types	 of	 fuel.	 In	
particular,	 its	design	 technology	 is	one	 that	cannot	be	easily	
mastered.	Furthermore,	codes	and	standards	applicable	to	the	
design,	manufacture,	inspection,	tests,	and	surveillance	of	the	
fuel	in	these	two	countries	are	different	in	the	U.S.	and	French	
programs.
In	order	to	jump	over	this	hurdle	and	to	achieve	the	localiza-
tion	 objective	 at	 the	 earliest	 possible	 period,	 with	 the	 least	
amount	of	expenditure,	KAERI	ended	up	with	the	following	con-
ditions	for	importing	technology	from	abroad:
(1)	KAERI	should	be	fully	empowered,	including	in	its	selec-
tion	of	technology	providers.	Priority	will	be	given	to	the	degree	
and	contents	of	 the	provider’s	 technology-transfer	 terms	 from	
KAERIs	perspective.
(2)	The	contract	form	will	be	a	joint	design	between	technol-
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ogy	provider	and	recipient.	However,	the	responsibility	for	the	
integrity	of	the	output	will	be	borne	by	the	recipient.
(3)	The	construction	cost	for	the	fuel	fabrication	plant	to	be	
built	at	home	will	be	financed	by	domestic	(Korean)	sources.
As	the	result	of	public	bidding,	the	German	firm	KWU	(Sie-
mens)	was	selected,	because	its	terms	and	conditions	for	tech-
nology	transfer	were	most	favorable	among	all	bidders.	It	was	
agreed	in	the	contract	that	the	training	for	recipient	party’s	engi-
neers	will	be	carried	by	on-the-job	participation;	that	is,	to	de-
ploy	trainees	at	each	specialty	group	and	every	job	site	from	the	
beginning.	This	new	training	concept	was	considered	plausible	
and	workable	because	most	of	the	trainees	had	already	been	ex-
posed	 to	 the	 fundamental	 technologies,	 and	 the	 majority	 of	
them	had	a	few	years	of	a	post-doctorate	career.	In	addition,	the	
Korean	trainees	at	KWU	worked	more	than	60	hours	per	week	
with	tenacious	effort.
At	 last,	 the	 PWR	 fuel	 fabrication	 plant	was	 constructed	 at	
KAERI	within	the	budget	and	time	frame.	At	the	same	time,	the	
nuclear	fuel	group	became	legally	independent	from	KAERI	in	
1989,	and	it	was	named	KNFC,	Korea	Nuclear	Fuel	Company.	
At	present,	KNFC	supplies	all	the	necessary	CANDU	and	PWR	
fuel	in	Korea.	KNFC	also	fabricates	the	zircaloy	tubing,	which	
accounts	for	more	than	one-third	of	the	nuclear	fuel	fabrication	
cost.
	Korea’s	Changing	Status	and	Role
Korea	has	gone	through	thick	and	thin,	with	many	challenges,	
and	is	the	only	country	in	the	world,	that	has	transformed	its	sta-
tus	from	an	LDC	(least-developed	country)	to	a	nuclear-devel-
oped	nation	in	the	past	50	years.
When	my	generation	was	young,	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	we	
were	stricken	with	hunger	and	cold,	clad	in	tattered	clothes,	and	
we	usually	slept	in	naturally	well	air-conditioned	rooms	without	
Figure	3
KOREA’S	SMART:		
A	DUAL	PURPOSE	REACTOR	FOR	
POWER	GENERATION		
		AND	DESALINATION
SMART	 stands	 for	 System-integrated	
Modular	Advanced	ReacTor,	designed	
by	the	Korea	Atomic	Energy	Research	
Institute	as	a	110	MW	electric	power	
reactor,	 enough	 to	meet	 the	demand	
for	 electricity	 and	water	 for	 100,000	
inhabitants.
Human	 history	 is	 entering	 a	 new	
era,	wherein	a	severe	shortage	of	water	
is	presumed	to	occur	in	many	parts	of	
the	world,	as	a	result	of	climate	changes,	rapid	population	
increase,	 and	 industrialization.	To	cope	with	 this	problem,	
KAERI	developed	SMART,	with	the	blessing	of	the	IAEA	and	
in	consultation	with	a	few	water-thirsty	countries.
SMART	is	an	integral	type	reactor	with	new	innovative	de-
sign	 features	and	proven	 technologies,	aimed	at	achieving	
enhanced	safety	and	improved	economics,	by	incorporating	
inherent	 safety	 improvement	 features	 and	 reliable	 passive	
systems.	The	improved	economics	is	achieved	by	means	of	
system	simplification,	component	modularization,	construc-
tion	time	reduction	by	in-shop	fabrication	and	site	installa-
tion,	and	increased	operating	availability.
The	low	power-density	design	has	a	core	fueled	by	urani-
um	oxide,	and	is	proven	to	provide	a	thermal	margin	of	more	
than	15	percent	to	accommodate	design	basis	transients	as-
sociated	with	critical	heat	flux.	The	soluble	boron-free	design	
provides	a	strong	negative	moderator	coefficient	over	the	en-
tire	fuel	cycle	and	therefore	improves	reactor	transients	and	
load-following	capacity.	A	modular	type	once-through	steam	
generator	 has	 an	 innovative	 design	 feature	 with	 helically	
coiled	tubes	to	produce	superheated	steam	at	normal	operat-
ing	conditions.
All	major	primary	components	are	contained	in	a	single	
pressurized	vessel.	The	system	pressure	is	passively	adjusted	
by	partial	pressure	of	 steam	and	nitrogen	gas	filled	 in	 the	
pressurizer	in	accordance	with	variation	in	pressure	and	tem-
perature	of	the	primary	coolant.
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beds	in	the	winter	seasons.	At	that	time,	our	hope	was	how	to	
become	affluent,	and,	in	other	words,	it	meant	to	be	fat,	prefer-
ably	being	full	of	nutrition	storage	under	the	skin.
These	 days,	 in	 the	 21st	 Century,	 people	 desire	 not	 to	 be	
obese,	but	to	become	slim	and	thin,	even	wearing	intentionally	
tattered	blue-jeans.	Thus,	people’s	hopes	change	with	time,	and	
the	utmost	desire	of	mankind	in	the	present	era	is	sustainable	
development	along	with	environmental	conservation,	and	nu-
clear	energy	can	be	one	of	the	major	contributors	in	this	equa-
tion.
The	Republic	of	Korea	joined	the	Organization	for	Economic	
Cooperation	and	Development	 in	1997,	and	also	 the	Geneva	
Group	in	2006.	Until	last	year,	Korea’s	United	Nations	Base	Rate	
Share	had	been	1.73	percent,	but	it	was	increased	to	2.17	per-
cent	as	of	this	year,	thus	becoming	the	11th	highest	among	near-
ly	200	U.N.	member	states;	it	corresponds	to	our	GDP	or	GNP.	
(The	U.N.	Base	Rate	Share	of	the	economic	giants,	the	United	
States	and	Japan,	is	25	percent	and	12.5	percent,	respectively.)
	IAEA’s	case	study	report	published	recently	pointed	out	that	
nuclear	energy	in	Korea	played	a	crucial	role	in	realizing	Korea’s	
“Economic	Miracle.”	The	main	contents	of	the	report	are:
•	 Korea’s	nuclear	energy	(including	RI	and	radiation)	consti-
tutes	2.2	percent	added	value	to	its	GDP.
•	 Nuclear	 technology	 self-reliance	has	been	demonstrated	
by	 the	development	 and	deployment	of	 the	KSNP,	 the	Korea	
Standard	Nuclear	Power	Plant,	PWR-1000	MW,	which	is	unique	
in	the	world.
•	 Korea	 is	 a	 successful	 example	 of	 national	 development	
from	an	agro-society	to	a	high-tech	state	that	is	enjoying	several	
top	world	commodities	in	the	global	market.
•	 Korea	was	a	“recipient	country”	when	the	IAEA	was	estab-
lished,	but	is	now	a	representative	“donor	country.”
In	this	regard,	I	have	a	say:	As	far	as	nuclear	training	is	con-
cerned,	I	was	a	technology	recipient	from	the	IAEA	and	the	Unit-
ed	States	on	many	occasions	in	the	1950s	to	1970s.	After	that,	
people	 started	 calling	 me	 a	 nuclear	 engineer.	 In	 the	 1980s-
1990s,	I	was	often	recruited	by	the	IAEA	as	a	consultant	for	tech-
nical	projects,	and	I	presided	over	many	technical	meetings	as	
chairman.
Several	years	ago,	the	IAEA	dispatched	me	and	Dr.	John	Run-
do	of	the	United	States	to	Africa	to	evaluate	the	IAEA-supported	
projects,	 to	 interview	 former	 IAEA	 trainees,	 and	 to	 help	 the	
member	 states	 in	drawing	up	 their	national	nuclear	develop-
ment	program	if	necessary.
In	this	connection,	it	has	been	customary	for	the	host	country	
to	provide	the	IAEA	Mission	with	a	car	and	chauffeur.	Neverthe-
less,	one	of	the	member	states	did	not	do	it	for	us.	So	we	had	to	
rely	on	taxicabs	and	a	rental	car.	Upon	their	request	one	day,	Dr.	
Rundo	and	I	gave	a	one-hour	lecture	each	to	a	few	hundred	par-
ticipants.	At	the	end	of	my	lecture,	I	wrote	the	following	words	
on	the	blackboard	:	“We	like	Africa.	We	love	Africa.”
I	read	it	such	that	we	like	Africa	because	of	many	reasons,	and	
we	love	Africa	from	the	bottom	of	our	hearts.	Then	I	added	the	
third	line	:	“We	need	Africa	in	terms	of	ah-free-cah.”
	To	this	expression,	a	dignitary	sitting	at	the	first	line	of	the	au-
dience	stood	up	gently	and	shook	hands	with	me,	saying,	“Sorry,	
we	will	send	car	and	driver	to	you	from	tomorrow.”
	Research	and	Development
R&D	 stands	 for	 Research	 and	Development.	The	 scope	 of	
R&D	has	been	extended	to	R&DDD	by	the	addition	of	Demon-
stration	and	Deployment.
I’d	like	to	introduce	a	new	vocabulary,	under	the	acronym	of	
R&Penta-D,	or	R&DDDDD,	that	is	supplemented	with	Driving	
(Operation	&	Maintenance)	and	Decommissioning.	In	our	busi-
ness,	nuclear	personnel	must	be	responsible	for	carrying	out	a	
lifelong	caretaker	role	of	facilities,	up	to	the	end	of	their	life,	that	
is,	until	plant	decommissioning.	That	is	why	I’m	proposing	to	
add	two	more	“D”s	to	R&DDD.
	Here	are	the	critical	items	for	our	R&D	activities:
•	 Fuel	cell	and	hydrogen	production	by	a	nuclear	reactor,	as	
well	as	hydrogen	storage	and	distribution.	The	high-temperture	
gas-cooled	reactor,	HTGR,	must	be	further	upgraded	and	im-
proved	in	this	regard.
	•	 The	development	of	superconductor	and	electricity	stor-
age	technologies.
•	Wireless	transmission	of	electricity.
At	present,	Korean	researchers	announced	that	they	have	suc-
ceeded	in	transmitting	electricity	without	a	conductor	for	a	dis-
tance	of	1	centimeter,	and	NASA	researchers	have	announced	
that	they	have	accomplished	a	wireless	transmission	of	electric-
ity	between	a	1-kilometer	gap.
	•	 The	development	of	a	fusion	reactor.	As	the	international	
tokamak	ITER	stands	for	“way”	in	Latin,	it	will	yet	be	a	steep	
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and	 thorny	way	with	 lots	of	engineering	and	material	prob-
lems,	and	such	problems	must	be	solved	by	“Tinkers”	rather	
than	“Thinkers.”
•	 Once	I	was	deeply	engaged	in	the	submarine	transmission	
line	connection	project	between	Korea	and	Japan,	which	spans	
200	kilometers.	To	this	end,	my	friend	recruited	a	cable	manu-
facturer,	bank,	engineering	company,	and	so	on;	and	actually	
there	was	consensus	or	agreement	between	the	two	parties	for	
the	implementation	of	this	project,	considering	the	merit	that	the	
electricity	price	in	Korea	is	45	percent	of	that	in	Japan,	and	that	
electricity	quality	in	Korea	is	superb.
Conclusion
As	of	the	end	of	2006,	the	number	of	operating	nuclear	power	
plants	in	the	world	was	435	units	or	370	gigawatts,	plus	26	ad-
ditional	units	 (21	GW)	 that	are	under	construction.	By	2030,	
global	nuclear	power	generation	capacity	will	increase	to	640	
GW,	 that	 is	 1.73	 times	 the	 present	 capacity	 (370	GW).	This	
means	we	will	have	270	additional	gigawatts	about	270	more	
units	than	now	during	the	forthcoming	23	years,	and	the	nuclear	
share	out	of	the	total	installed	capacity	will	augment	from	the	
present	16	percent	to	27	percent	by	that	time.
Most	of	the	currently	operating	nuclear	units	will	be	either	re-
furbished,	 life-extended,	 shut-down	 or	 decommissioned	 by	
2030,	and	all	such	works	will	have	to	be	carried	out	by	nuclear	
professionals.	 In	 this	context,	 today’s	nuclear	students	will	be	
called	upon	to	implement	these	projects,	which	constitute	a	tre-
mendous	volume	of	work.
In	fact,	there	are	many	people	and	at	the	same	time,	there	are	
only	a	few	people.	Here	“many	people”	means	the	general	pub-
lic,	who	are	waiting	for	the	supply	of	reliable,	safe,	and	cheap	
electricity;	while	“few	people”	connotes	the	capable	and	dedi-
cated	manpower	who	can	be	deployed	to	meet	these	require-
ments	 from	the	general	public.	
To	make	a	long	story	short,	the	
future	will	hold	 lots	of	nuclear	
projects.
	 Nuclear	 projects	 require	
long	 lead	 and	 construction	
times,	lots	of	preparatory	work,	
huge	capital	cost,	a	variety	of	
numerous	 dedicated	 special-
ists,	 and,	 in	 particular,	 public	
acceptance.	However,	nuclear	
technology	 is	 younger	 than	
those	of	 the	 computer,	 televi-
sion,	 airplanes,	 and	 others.	 It	
is,	therefore,	worth	participat-
ing	in	its	challenges	in	consid-
eration	 of	 the	 significant	 po-
tential	 benefits	 in	 the	 future,	
looming	on	the	horizon.
One	day,	Albert	Einstein	was	
asked	by	a	newspaper	reporter:	
“Why	can’t	we	get	rid	of	the	nuclear	war	threat?”
“Because	politics	is	more	complicated	and	difficult	than	phys-
ics,”	was	his	answer.	So,	I’ll	not	touch	upon	these	tricky	politics	
here.	I’ll	wrap	up	this	lecture	with	the	following	solicitation:	To	
those	who	are	from	countries	or	organizations	without	an	oper-
ating	nuclear	reactor	and	with	relatively	underdeveloped	indus-
trial	 or	 institutional	 infrastructures,	my	message	 is	 to	 go	 and	
preach	the	nuclear	gospel	even	in	the	wilderness,	and	win	con-
verts	and	public	mandates—that	is,	carry	light	to	the	darkness	
with	nuclear	light	bulbs
To	those	who	are	from	countries	with	aging	nuclear	facilities	
and	whose	nuclear	program	has	been	inert	for	decades,	my	mes-
sage	is	that	the	Nuclear	Renaissance	is	never	a	free	gift	from	a	
merciful	and	generous	Santa	Claus,	but	can	only	come	from	un-
ending	 do-it-yourself	 efforts	 and	 perspiration.	Your	 forebears	
have	already	gone	down	the	steep	learning	curves,	and	you	are	
already	blessed	with	a	font	of	native	original	insight	for	the	chal-
lenges	ahead.
To	those	who	are	from	countries	having	steady	ongoing	nu-
clear	projects	and	whose	operational	record	has	been	satis-
factory,	my	message	is	that	your	first	enemy	is	the	self-compla-
cency	that	lurks	within	you.	What	you	desperately	need	is	not	
complacence	but	continued	complaisance	in	your	daily	work!	
Always	be	vigilant	and	 innovative.	 In	addition,	you	have	 to	
pay	 heed	 to	 the	 catch-phrase	 from	 the	 Japanese	 industry:	
“Wring	 your	 dry	 rag	 further	 and	 once	 more,	 for	 that	 last	
drop.”
	In	conclusion,	you	are	cordially	invited	to	display	your	cali-
ber	as	a	robust	“Nuclear	Stallion”	here,	there,	and	everywhere,	
all	the	time	from	now	on.	In	order	for	me	to	see	your	Earth-sav-
ing	activities	and	also	to	clap	my	hands	in	applause	for	your	
success,	I’m	going	to	apply	to	the	Absolute	Being	for	my	“Life	
Extension.”
Dr.	Lee	with	the	2005	edition	(in	83	volumes),	of	the	Korea	Electric	Power	Industry	Code,	whose	
publication	he	organized	and	oversaw
